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Analysis
The Rise and Fall of Access to
Justice inThe Netherlands
HannaTolsma,* Kars de Graaf and Jan Jans
Abstract
This article analyses the development of access to justice for environ-
mental organisations in Dutch law. It consists of two parts. The first
part focuses on the rise of environmental organisations’ right of access
to the courts, and considers case law and legislation relating to the
General Administrative Law Act and environmental permitting. It also
discusses possibilities for environmental organisations to bring
proceedings before the civil courts. The second part addresses the
dismantling of the right of access to the courts. Recent developments
in the legislation and case law are discussed as well as possible future
changes in this respect. The article concludes with some final remarks
concerning the present situation in the Netherlands in relation to the
Aarhus Convention.
Keywords: access to justice, standing, interested party, aarhus
convention, enforcement, compliance
1. Introduction
With the adoption of the Aarhus Convention and the European legislation
implementing it, the rights of environmental organisations have been firmly
anchored in international and European law.1 The question arises to what
*Department of Administrative Law and Public Administration, University of Groningen,
The Netherlands (h.d.tolsma@rug.nl).
1 UN/ECE Convention on Access to Information, Public Participation in Decision-Making and
Access to Justice in Environmental Matters (the Aarhus Convention), done at Aarhus on 25
June 1998. The Netherlands ratified the Convention on 30 September 2004, Stb. 2004, nr. 518.
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extent this development at the international level has consequences for the
national legal systems. In the Netherlands, but also in Germany, environmental
organisations’ access to the legal system is a topic that is much discussed. In
Germany, for example, it has been argued since the Convention was adopted
that the role of interest groups, and particularly environmental groups,
should be increased. Conversely, the tendency in the Netherlands seems to be
the very opposite. Initially, from the 1970s, the Dutch system of civil and
administrative law afforded environmental organisations ample opportunity
to bring actions before the courts. A study commissioned by the European
Commission on access to justice in environmental matters in eight European
countries showed, for example, that in the period 1996^2001 environmental
organisations in the Netherlands brought by far the most cases.2 However,
even though the Aarhus Convention aims to guarantee broad access to justice
in environmental matters, it has latterly been argued in the Dutch Parliament
that environmental organisations’ access to the courts should be curtailed.
In 2007, a motion by a member of the Lower House, Mark Rutte, aiming
to deprive ‘professional complainants’, who he claimed were obstructing
necessary measures by ‘abusing’ their rights and thus delaying economic devel-
opment, of access to the courts was rejected only narrowly.3 In December
2007, a majority in the Lower House did in fact support a motion requesting
the Government to introduce a requirement limiting standing to those
whose interest is protected by the legal rule in question in the General
Administrative Law Act (Algemene wet bestuursrecht, GALA).4 And even more
recently the Administrative Jurisdiction Division of the Council of State
(Afdeling bestuursrechtspraak), the highest administrative court in the
Netherlands, has seemed to come down on the side of the restrictionists.
‘Council of State shows professional complainants short shrift’ and ‘Council
of State consigns environment to back seat in solo action’ were among the
headlines in late 2008.5
This article analyses the development of access to justice for environmental
organisations in Dutch law. It consists of two parts. The first part (Section 2)
focuses on the rise of environmental organisations’ right of access to the
courts, and considers case law and legislation relating to the GALA and
environmental permitting. It also discusses possibilities for environmental
organisations to bring proceedings before the civil courts. The second part
(Section 3) addresses the dismantling of the right of access to the courts.
2 N De Sadeleer, G Roller and M Dross, Access to Justice in Environmental Matters and the Role of
NGOs. Empirical Findings and Legal Appraisal (the Avosetta Series (6)) (Europa Law
Publishing, Groningen 2005).
3 Lower House II 2007/08, 31 200, nr 19.
4 Lower House 2007/08, 31 200 XII, nr 70.
5 Adri Vermaat, ‘Raad van State rekent af met beroepsklagers’, Trouw 2 October 2008; Wim
Struijlaart and Ron Ritzen, ‘Raad van State zet op eigen houtje milieu op zijspoor’, Trouw
14 October 2008.
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Recent developments in the legislation and case law are discussed as well as
possible future changes in this respect. The article concludes with some final
remarks concerning the present situation in the Netherlands in relation to
the Aarhus Convention (Section 4).
2. The rise of a right of access to the courts for
environmental organisations
Until the mid 1970s the administrative courts had largely kept environmental
organisations out of the courts. It was virtually impossible for these organisa-
tions to bring an action against a permit granted by a public authority to
carry out a particular activity and the same applied to direct legal action
against polluters before the civil courts. This meant that cases brought by
environmental organisations against the initiators of polluting activities were
not given a substantive hearing. Environmental organisations were effectively
denied access to justice. This state of affairs led to much criticism in academic
and political circles.6 However, the case law and legislation that will be
described below changed environmental organisations’ right of access to the
courts in such a way that it became an important feature of Dutch law, and
set an example for various other countries. Administrative courts accepted
environmental organisations’ right to access the courts; this was reflected in
the case law and ultimately codified in the GALA. In the particular area
addressed in this article, environmental permitting, the legislature even went
so far as to introduce a separate regime: the actio popularis. As a result any
person could, in principle, bring an action against a decision of the administra-
tion. A fundamental change was evident, not only in the administrative
courts, but also in the civil courts as regards the right of environmental
organisations to access the courts.
2.1 Environmental organisations’ right of access to the civil courts
The decision of the Netherlands Supreme Court (Hoge Raad) of 17 June 1986 in
the Nieuwe Meer case was a groundbreaking decision on the right of environ-
mental organisations to bring an action in the civil courts. In this case, the
Supreme Court ruled on the question whether it was legally possible for an
organisation to bring a civil action to protect a public interest.7 For the first
time it held a claim by environmental organisations admissible in a civil
action against a polluter. Previous actions before a civil court, such as those
6 Van Male 1992, 55.
7 HR 17 June 1986, NJ 1987, 743 (with note by Heemskerk), AB 1987, 173 (with note byVan den
Burg), AA 1986, 638 (with note by Nieuwenhuis).
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brought by the association for the conservation of the Waddenzee against
offshore drilling trials, had been held inadmissible because the interests the
association aimed to protect were not specific interests of the claimants but
public interests affecting everyone, which were ostensibly protected by the
administration.8 The Nieuwe Meer case involved an action for an injunction to
make the municipality of Amsterdam discontinue dumping sludge from
the Amsterdam canals in the Nieuwe Meer (a nearby artificial lake) until the
requisite permits had been granted. From the judgment it emerged that an
action by an environmental organisation would be admissible if it fulfilled a
number of requirements.9 The organisation would have to be a legal person;
its stated object would have to include protection of the public interest on
which the action was based; and the action would itself have to aim to protect
such an interest. The Supreme Court regarded this as constituting an excep-
tion to the rule:
In the first place, the interests involved in an action such as the
present one ^ essentially aiming to obtain a ban on further harming the
environment ^ lend themselves to ‘pooling’ such as has been achieved by
the environmental associations’ legal action; by contrast, if this were not
possible, efficient legal protection against a threatened impairment of
these interests ^ which as a rule affect large groups of citizens collec-
tively, while the consequences of such impairment as regards each of
these citizens are often hard to predict ^ might be made considerably
more difficult.
The Supreme Court felt it important that environmental organisations
should have been able to participate in a permitting procedure and have
had opportunities to appeal the decision. It also felt that an environmental
organisation entitled to exercise these rights in a permitting procedure should
also be able to bring an action for an interim injunction against acts which it
felt were wrongfully being carried out without a permit and which could in
principle result in impairment of the interests the association aimed to protect.
From the later judgments in Kuunders and Covra it is clear that the right to
efficient legal protection is crucial when determining standing.10 Thus,
the requirement that an organisation must undertake actual activities in
8 Pres Rb Rotterdam 21 July 1972; Hof Den Haag 25 May 1973, NJ 1974, 35.
9 Cf MA Heldeweg, RJN Schlo« ssels and RJGH Seerden, De kwadratuur van de algemeen
belangactie? Over de legitimiteit van algemeen belangacties in democratisch-rechtsstatelijk
en rechtsvergelijkend perspectief, RM Themis 2000/2, 46; MA Robesin, ‘Procedeerlust
opwekkend en remmend privaatrecht’ in RJJ van Acht and GC Sicking (eds), Privaatrecht en
Milieurecht (W.E.J. TjeenkWillink, Zwolle 1994) 58^9.
10 HR 17 January 1997, NJ 1998, 656, with note byARB (Covra); HR 18 December 1992, NJ 1994,
139, with note by CJHB (Kuunders).
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furtherance of the aim it seeks to promote does not apply when it is defending
interests which do not really lend themselves to protection by individual legal
action but could appropriately be pooled. In 1994, a provision was included in
section 3:305a of the Netherlands Civil Code effectively codifying the case law.
The first paragraph provides that if a foundation or association with full
legal capacity protects interests pursuant to its articles, it can bring an action
to protect similar interests of other persons.
2.2 The concept of ‘interested party’ in Dutch administrative law
The right of environmental organisations to appeal against administrative
decisions to the courts has been incorporated in Dutch law since 1994, in sub-
sections 1 and 3 of section 1:2 GALA. This codified the case law that had been
developed by the administrative courts since the 1970s. The first subsection
defines ‘interested party’ as ‘a person whose interest is directly affected by a
decision’. According to the case law, the interest affected must be the person’s
own, personal, objectively determinable, current and directly affected interest.
Under subsection 1 it is not possible for natural persons to act to protect
public interests, such as protection of the environment, nature conservation
or the preservation of historic buildings. These are public interests which go
beyond the interests of any individual. An individual seeking to protect such
a public interest will therefore never be able to satisfy the requirement that
the interest is his own, personal and objectively determinable. Subsection 3
creates additional possibilities for legal persons to act as an interested party.
This is achieved by deeming public interests (for example the environment)
and collective interests (for example of local residents) which legal persons
in particular protect pursuant to their objects and as evidenced by actual
activities, to be their own, personal and objectively determinable interests.
These conditions, under which an environmental organisation may be allowed
access to the courts, are cumulative; in other words, a legal person seeking
‘in particular’ to protect a public interest must do this not only pursuant to its
objects but also as evidenced by actual activities.
That an environmental organisation should in particular seek to protect a
public interest must follow from its objects as defined in its articles. If its
objects are defined too widely or too narrowly, any claim it brings will not be
considered admissible by an administrative court and it will have no access to
judicial protection before the administrative courts. It is because of this
requirement that, for example, political parties do not have a right to access
the courts in such matters. An environmental organisation that has defined
its objects in a way that is tantamount to ‘protecting the public interest’ will
be denied access to the courts. However, the case law on this point is not
always entirely clear. Both organisations with very specific objects and those
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with very wide objects have on occasion been allowed access.11 In addition to
having appropriate objects, it must be evidenced by the actual activities of the
organisation that it particularly seeks to protect a public interest. From the
explanatory memorandum on the legislation it follows that this requirement
means that interest groups must actually be active in promoting the object for
which they were established.12 For this reason, interest groups that exist only
on paper will not be regarded as an interested party in this sense.
Given that anybody can set up a legal person and write the objects himself,
it will be clear from the above that anybody is also free to set up a public
interest group and be active for it. Such a group is entitled, as an interested
party, to bring an action against decisions directly affecting the public interest
in question. In a sense, therefore, subsection 3 creates an actio popularis,
granting everyone access to judicial protection by the administrative courts.13
2.3 A separate regime for environmental permitting
Notwithstanding the restrictions implied by the interested party concept as
defined in the GALA, the legislature had occasionally passed special legislation
which explicitly granted wider access to the courts. Such explicit departures
from the interested party regime were to be found in spatial planning and
environmental legislation, in particular in relation to municipal planning and
environmental permitting procedures. In the past, the legislature had opted
for a phased actio popularis. This meant that everyone was entitled to express
a view on a draft decision during the preparatory phase of decision making.
In addition, for a long time anyone who expressed a view during the prepara-
tory phase was subsequently entitled to bring an action before the administra-
tive courts against the ultimate decision. The principal argument in favour of
this wide right of access to the courts in the field of environmental permitting
is that planning procedures and environmental permitting procedures involve
supra-individual interests. If there is no possibility of anyone acting to protect
such public interests, there is a real risk that they will be largely ignored
during the decision-making process. A right of access to the courts that
is open to everybody can, in other words, contribute to the quality of decision-
making.14 Indeed, this is the reason the position of environmental organi-
sations was strengthened at the international level.15
11 RJN Schlo« ssels, De belanghebbende (Kluwer, Deventer 2004), 122.
12 PG Awb I, 149.
13 PJJ van Buuren,‘Zin en onzin over de actio popularis’, in BPM van Ravels and MAVoorst (eds),
Natuurlijk van belang (Kluwer, Deventer 2003), 161.
14 Schlo« ssels (n 11) 12.
15 F de Lange, ‘Er is meer tussen EVRM en Awb’,TO 2004, 211.
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2.4 Conclusion
In the Netherlands, environmental organisations can bring an action on twin
tracks, in other words before the civil courts and the administrative courts.16
There is however some degree of coordination between the civil track and the
administrative track to ensure that work is divided efficiently between the
two and to avoid conflicting judgments. It follows, for example, from the Covra
judgment that an environmental organisation that has brought an unsuccess-
ful action in the administrative courts cannot then raise the same questions
again in civil proceedings.17 The decision to grant the contested permit has
acquired formal force of law and can no longer be challenged. All that remains
for the civil courts is to determine whether more stringent requirements may
be imposed on a permit holder than required by the permit. According to
the Supreme Court a further civil action will succeed only in exceptional
circumstances.
3. The potential fall of environmental organisations’ right
of access to the courts
The right of environmental organisations in the Netherlands to access
the courts has been under fire for some years now. Actions by environmental
organisations are regarded as an obstacle to industry. The idea that court
actions last an unacceptably long time because of the wide circle of people
entitled to bring actions has also become accepted wisdom in the political
arena. The decline of environmental organisations’ right of access to
the courts began with the legislature’s abolition of the actio popularis. More
recently the courts have toughened the requirements for a claim to be admissi-
ble under subsection 3 of section 1:2 GALA. And if a measure, under
serious consideration, is introduced limiting standing to those whose interest
is protected by the legal rule in question, environmental organisations’ right
of access to the courts will be curtailed even further.
3.1 The actio popularis in environmental permitting under fire
The actio popularis was abolished in respect of environmental permitting on
1 July 2005. Currently, unlike the situation previously, access to the courts
in respect of municipal planning procedures and an important category of
environmental permits is no longer open to everybody. The legislature has
opted to bring the regime applying to environmental permitting into line
16 See Heldeweg and others (n 9).
17 HR 17 January 1997, NJ 1998, 656, with note byARB (Covra).
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with the interested party regime in section 1:2 GALA. According to the
Government, the change in the law sends an important signal that serious
efforts are being made to reduce ‘unnecessary’ litigation.18 It was not however
expected that the change would bring about a significant reduction in
the number of actions brought by environmental organisations, as earlier
research had already indicated that environmental organisations could
in practice often be deemed to be interested parties within the meaning of sub-
section 3.19 Given that, since the law changed, the administrative courts have
to determine the extent to which a person can be regarded as an interested
party, it is likely that more case law will be forthcoming on the question
whether environmental organisations can be regarded as an interested party.
On the one hand, it is true that participation is still open to anybody in
respect of a number of important environmental permitting decisions, such
as whether or not to grant an environmental permit and the adoption of
municipal zoning plans. On the other hand, however, there are a number of
recent legislative proposals in which the Lower House has explicitly provided
that participation is open only to interested parties. Consider, for example,
the proposed new law on environmental licensing, which will integrate the
25 existing licensing systems in a new single environmental licence, or the
new drinking water legislation, which will integrate six licensing systems in a
single water licence. During the legislative process it has become increasingly
clear that the Dutch Parliament is opposed to an actio popularis, even in
the preparatory phase of decision making. Both proposed laws were initially
introduced to Parliament containing elements of an actio popularis as regards
the preparatory phase of the licences concerned, but in both cases the
Lower House explicitly rejected these elements by limiting the possibility of
expressing views to interested parties.20
Fundamental grounds have been put forward for abolishing the actio
popularis.21 The most important is that such an action cuts an
odd figure in the Dutch system of legal protection. In the Netherlands, admin-
istrative law focuses primarily on protecting individual rights (recours subjectif).
In a system based on the protection of individual rights, it is argued that it is
inappropriate for environmental organisations to be able to enforce the law by
contesting the legality of administrative decisions (recours objectif). Although
it is regarded as wholly appropriate that these organisations should be able to
participate in the preparatory phase of decision making, beyond this phase
18 Lower House 2003/04, 29 421, nr 3, p 4.
19 AAJ de Gier, J Robbe and ChW Backes, De actio popularis in het ruimtelijke ordenings- en
milieurecht, Ministerie van Volkshuisvesting, Ruimtelijke Ordening en Milieubeheer, June
1999.
20 Lower House 2007/08, 30 844, nr 16 and 30 818, nr 17.
21 Among others: N Verheij, ‘Weg met de actio popularis!’, TO 2004, 146; JMHF Teunissen,
‘De algemeen belangorganisaties als bestuursrechtelijk (pseudo-) Openbaar Ministerie?’, Gst.
2003, 7179, 64^5.
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access to justice should be open only to those whose individual rights are
affected. A further argument is the lack of democratic legitimation of environ-
mental organisations seeking to pursue a public interest before the courts.
Protection of the public interest, it is argued, is an exclusive task of the
administration. It is the administration that ultimately makes a decision
based on the legislation. There is no objection to environmental organisations
participating in the decision-making process before the final decision is
taken, but once a decision has been made it is felt inappropriate that they
should protect the public interest before the courts.
3.2 The general right of access to the courts for public interest groups
under fire
The arguments put forward to support abolition of the actio popularis are also
used to oppose environmental organisations’ right of access to the courts
under subsection 3 of section 1:2 GALA. There are even those who argue that
this right should be done away with altogether.22 This was the view taken by
the Lower House when it adopted a motion expressing the wish that the
Government should examine a change in the law to this effect.23 Subsection 3
has remained unaltered since 1994. It does however seem that this desire to
limit environmental organisations’ right of access to the courts has recently
induced the highest administrative court to change tack as regards the inter-
pretation of subsection 3. Given the desirability expressed both in the political
arena and in legal discourse of introducing a requirement restricting standing
before the administrative courts to those directly affected, the Supreme
Court seems to be accommodating this wish.
3.2.1 Limiting access to the courts: interpretation of subsection 3
On 1 October 2008, the Judicial Jurisdiction Division of the Council of State
ruled on the admissibility of a claim by Stichting Openbare Ruimte, an associa-
tion dedicated to promoting a healthy and sustainable environment and good
spatial planning.24 The association was appealing a decision of the provincial
executive of Limburg granting a permit to a poultry farm under section 16 of
the Nature Conservation Act (Natuurbeschermingswet) 1998. The court
held that the association could not be regarded as an interested party for two
reasons. In the first place, the stated objects were so widely formulated that
22 Verheij (n 21); Teunissen (n 21).
23 See Handelingen II 2002/03, 34-2445, 34-2446.
24 ABRvS 1 October 2008, AB 2008/348, with note by Michiels; JB 2008/239; with note by
Schlo« ssels.
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there could be no question of a public interest that was in particular protected
by the association. According to article 2 of its articles, the association’s
object was to achieve ‘a qualitatively sustainable living environment for all
living beings, including both the local, national and global living environment’.
This comprehensive object is indeed not very specific. It is, however, interesting
to note that the court did not then simply conclude that the association was
not an interested party, as it has in the past, but went on to consider its
actual activities.25 In our view it is debatable whether an interpretation allow-
ing the degree to which an association can be regarded as an interested
partyçdespite its having too widely formulated objectsçto be determined
with regard to its actual activities is consistent with the text of subsection 3
of section 1:2 GALA. After all, it is clear from the legislation that the require-
ments must be regarded as cumulative.
The heart of the new line in the case law is however formed by the court’s
restrictive interpretation of the concept of actual activities. The association
concerns itself primarily with submitting enforcement applications, expressing
views on decisions and bringing actions before the courts. According to the
court, these are not actual activities from which it emerges that the association
is in particular protecting a public interest. The court observed ‘that merely
bringing legal proceedings against decisions cannot as a rule be regarded as
actual activities within the meaning of subsection 3.’ In our view, the court
adopts a remarkably sweeping view of ‘merely bringing legal proceedings’.
Expressing views against draft decisions in the preparatory phase, collecting
information in preparation of proceedings, and supplying information to third
parties about proceedings are all regarded as being inextricably connected
with bringing legal proceedings against decisions.
The arguments the court deploys deserve special consideration. That merely
bringing legal proceedings cannot be regarded as actual activities is necessary,
according to the court, because any other interpretation would amount to
allowing anyone to bring legal proceedings. This is hardly a very convincing
argument. From the legislative history of the abolition of the actio popularis, it
is absolutely clear that the legislature intended to maintain the prevailing
interpretation of the concept of interested party. Moreover, actual activities is
not the only condition that must be fulfilled: there are also the criteria of
legal personality and appropriate objects. It is also odd that the court seems
to following the line set out in the Nieuwe Meer judgment when it adds that
the association does not create a pooling of individual interests directly
affected by the contested decision, which might serve effective legal protection.
25 This would mean that an environmental organisation whose objects were too wide could
nevertheless be regarded as an interested party if its actual activities were deemed sufficient.
This could indeed have implied a relaxing of the interested party regime.
318 Hanna Tolsma, Kars de Graaf and Jan Jans
However, the very point of the Nieuwe Meer judgment was that it sought to
ensure environmental organisations would be able to pursue adequate legal
protection, whereas the court in this case uses the same argument to reverse
the position. In our view, by taking this line, the court is restricting environ-
mental organisations’ access to the courts without an express mandate from
the legislature and without supplying good arguments.
3.2.2 Limiting access to the courts: introduction of standing requirement
Access to the administrative courts in the Netherlands is regulated in such a
way that once a person has been deemed an interested party under the
GALA, that person then has access to the courts and in judicial proceedings
against a decision can and may put forward any argument that will lead to
the decision being quashed, regardless of whether there is any relationship
between the claimant’s interest and the argument put forward or the reason
for quashing the decision. Thus an action instituted by an environmental
organisation may result in a decision being quashed even if the rule infringed
is one that is not designed to protect the interest the environmental organisa-
tion is seeking to protect. Given this situation, which some regard as absurd,
and the basic premise in the Netherlands that the law serves to protect
individual interests, it has been advocated that a Schutznorm should be intro-
duced, a requirement limiting standing to those whose interest is protected
by the legal rule in question. Such a requirement would mean that an adminis-
trative court could only quash a decision if the administrative authority had
infringed a rule that aimed to protect the claimant’s interest. In 2007, the
Lower House adopted a motion in which the Government was requested to
introduce such a requirement in certain planning legislation and the GALA.26
One argument for introducing such a requirement is that it would be in line
with the development that the law is increasingly regarded as existing to
protect individual rights.27 It is debatable whether the introduction of such a
requirement would have much effect in practice. Empirical research has
shown that courts are rarely asked to decide on arguments against a decision
which do not have any connection at all with the interest the party arguing
them is seeking to protect.28
26 Lower House 29 385, nr 12.
27 BJ Schueler, Hoe ver strekt de rechtsbescherming in het omgevingsrecht? Over subjectivering
in het bestuursprocesrecht, TO 2005, 114^23; VAR-Commissie Rechtsbescherming, De
toekomst van de rechtsbescherming tegen de overheid. Van toetsing naar geschilbeslechting (BJu,
Den Haag 2004).
28 JCA de Poorter, BWN deWaard, AT, Marseille and MJ Zomer, Herijking van het belanghebbenden-
begrip. Een relativiteitsvereiste in het Awb-procesrecht? (BJu, Den Haag 2004). See note 27.
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4. The situation in the Netherlands as regards the
Aarhus Convention
As regards environmental organisations’access to justice, until just a few years
ago the Netherlands could be regarded as a shining example to other Member
States. However, recent developments in the legislature and case law have
resulted in the restriction of environmental organisations’ access to the
courts. In the light of the Aarhus Convention, how should this development
be judged? It is clear from the formation of the Convention that there is a
great deal of support at the international level for granting environmental
organisations access to courts. In our view the increasing emphasis on
protection of individual rights in Dutch administrative law is, if nothing else,
contrary to the spirit of the Convention.
There are those who say that the Convention opposes the abolition of the
phased actio popularis. Article 9, paragraph 2, of the Convention, taken
together with Article 6, can be read in such a way that participation in
decision making should also ensure access to the courts.29 On the other
hand, there are those who doubt whether Article 9 should be interpreted so
freely.30 This interpretation is at the heart of a pending reference to the ECJ
for a preliminary ruling.31 The outcome of this case may be crucial to the
further discussion on the development of access to the courts in the
Netherlands. In addition there is also debate as to whether the Aarhus
Convention opposes introduction of a standing requirement as referred to
above. There are authors who take the view that introduction of such a
requirement would seriously prejudice the right of environmental organisa-
tions to challenge the legality of decisions (Article 9, paragraph 2, of the
Convention) and to challenge acts and omissions contravening provisions of
the law relating to the environment (Article 9, paragraph 3).32 Others see
no conflict at all between the introduction of such a requirement and the
requirements of the Convention.33 There is, however, agreement in the litera-
ture that abolition of access to the courts under subsection 3 of section 1:2
GALAwill conflict with the Convention. According to proponents of abolition
of environmental organisations’ right of access to the courts, the Netherlands
must for this reason engage in international debate on the desirability of
29 de Lange (n 15) 212^13.
30 Schueler (n 27) 112.
31 See Case C-24/09.
32 de Lange (n 15) 216; RJGM Widdershoven, Rechtsbescherming in het milieurecht in Europees
perspectief’, M&R 2004, 540.
33 N Verheij, ‘Uit zuinigheid naar relativiteit. Naar een Schutznormvereiste in het bestuursrecht’
in AW Heringa e.a. (eds), Het bestuursrecht beschermd (Stroink-bundel) (Sdu, Den Haag 2006),
109; Schueler (n 27) 121.
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public interest actions.34 In the meantime the Judicial Jurisdiction Division
seems, with its change of course, to be seeking to come back into line
with the current political climate. It is our belief that this is, to put it mildly,
unlikely to serve protection of environmental interests in the Netherlands.
34 Verheij (n 21) 146.
The Rise and Fall of Access to Justice in The Netherlands 321
